A voice in the basket.
SEC governs permitted decisions. The vault sets boundaries that a successful vote cannot remove.
Design documentation · On-chain functions are not liveThe proposed SEC distribution.
| Allocation | Share | Design |
|---|---|---|
| Liquidity | 60% | For liquidity; permanent LP-position locking is intended |
| Treasury | 30% | Allocated to the timelock treasury |
| Airdrop allocation | 10% | Released to the treasury in 12 scheduled tranches |
| Team | 0% | No separate team allocation |
The token code mints its initial supply once in the constructor and exposes no further mint function. Holders can burn their own tokens, or authorize a burn through an allowance. The token has no built-in transfer tax; the proposed SEC hook belongs to the market layer.
How a vote reaches execution.
- A proposer needs sufficient delegated voting power.
- Voting opens after the configured delay and uses recorded voting power.
- A successful proposal must satisfy the voting and quorum rules.
- It enters a timelock before execution becomes possible.
- The target contract still checks its own limits.
| Parameter | Setting |
|---|---|
| Proposal threshold | 1,000,000 delegated SEC votes |
| Voting delay | 2 hours |
| Voting period | 7 days |
| Quorum | 4% of supply, under the Governor counting rules |
| Timelock delay | 48 hours |
These are initial configuration values, not a claim that governance is deployed. Voting power follows delegation and snapshots. Governance can also decide how treasury funds and future airdrop distributions are used.
What can change inside the vault.
Through the designated timelock, governance can retarget weights, add an oracle-registered asset or remove an asset the vault no longer holds. Every basket update must satisfy the contract's bounds.
| Limit | Rule |
|---|---|
| Basket size | 3 to 20 assets |
| Active target weight | 2% minimum; 40% maximum per asset |
| Weight movement | At most 5 percentage points per asset per update |
| Basket cooldown | 30 days between executed basket changes |
A 30-day cooldown between changes is not a guaranteed 30-day notice before the first change. Retiring an asset follows the weight-change limits and requires its remaining holding to be removed before it can leave the asset list.
What a vote cannot change.
The current vault code has no setters for its four fee rates, fixed fee recipient, oracle or swap router. Governance has no general function to withdraw vault assets, mint itself unbacked investor shares or pause redemption. These are code-level design properties, pending verified deployment.
Airdrop releases and liquidity locking.
The airdrop allocation is scheduled as 12 tranches, each 30 days apart. The first unlock is after the first full period. Anyone can trigger an available release, but it pays the fixed timelock recipient. Governance determines the actual distributions; the schedule is not an automatic monthly claim for every holder.
The existing liquidity-lock code accepts V3 LP positions and can collect their earned fees to a fixed recipient, without a withdrawal or liquidity-reduction function. It does not establish that liquidity is already locked. The final SEC market and hook need a compatible implementation and verification.
Staking utility.
Proposed staking tiers reduce creation and redemption fees only. Management, performance, trading-pool and hook fees are not discounted by this vault mechanism. The proposed withdrawal wait is seven days; requesting an unstake reduces the active stake tier immediately.
View the staking tiers and fees